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several enactments now and heretofore in fact
reference in section 27 4c
the Code of
Procedure are read in connection with section 869 of
the Penal Code, it appears that in an classes of criminal cases
eogllizable in the municipal courts, and iu a 1l civil cases
in whieh the n:porters are under
to
the compensation therefor bas been
aetion of t1Je Legislature
and the scheme has
fr,,m the outset contemplated that their compensation should
entirely of
and in no part of salaries. [20] Acwe eonelude that the provisions for salarie1; of
r•onrt reporters in San Diego are inapplicable to
mlirlieipal eomt reporters in that eounty, and that there :is
nn legal basis for the sa 1ar:- claim embraced in the crossl'l'mplaint of Milotz.
The judgment in favor of plaintiff on its complaint is
ren~rt>ed, bnt the judgment in favor of plaintiff and against
llefenclant Milot7. on the latter's eross-cornp]aint is affirmed;
tlw parties to bear their ovm costs on these appeals.
\;ibson, C.•T., Shenk, J., Carter,
:\!,;Comb, .J., concurred.

[Sa e. 0: o, 647:2.

ln Bank.

.] unc

Schauer, .L, and
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\Y ILLIAJ\I l<'lSCH.J1jH, H(·~polHlent, v. COU.'JTY OF
SHAS'l'A et al., Appellant::;.
[11 Highways-Maintenance-Lighting.-·A county, through it~
hoard o[ supeni:;or~, may use the special road maintenanet>
di~triet procedure provid!~rl in Sts. & Hy. CodP, ~ 1550.1, for
npernting nnd maintaining a :<treet lighting ~ystem which em
brac:Ps a state highway as well as county highwnys and strec:1ts
i11 nnin<'orporate([ COlllllllmities within tho county.
Id.-Definitions.-The word "road" as used in Sts. & Hy. Codr,
§ 1550.1, relating to road maintenance districts, ineludes a
state highway.
Statut.es-Construction-_:Presumptions.- It is
tlw t
thP LPgislature k!li'W tho meaning of the language used in a
! 1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Highway,; and Streets, § 66 et seq.
McK. Dig. References:
4, 6, 7] Highways, § 77; [2] High\\;Jys, §1; [3] Statutes, §185; [5] Highways, §73.
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statute and used it advisedly, such as that in
the tel'lll
"roads" in Sts. & Hy. Code, § 1550.1, and the term "county
highways" in §§ 1553, 1554, the Legislature intended that each
term should be given a different meaning.
Highways- Maintenance- Lighting.- The maintenance of
street lights on state highways does not lie exclusively
the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Works, since
a maintenance district and certain local
districts mav
maintain street lighting on state highways.
'
!d.-Maintenance-Statutory Provisions.-The
of
Sts. & Hy. Code, § 1550.1, relating to road maintenance districtB, does not necessarily limit the use of diRtrict funds
to roads that arc otherwise eligible for county road moneys,
the use of the word "additional" not being a limitation on the
use of the fund but rather a general description of it.
Id.-Maintenance-Lighting.-Sts. & Hy. Code, § 19002, expressly provides that the Highway Lighting District Act is
merely an alternative procedure for providing street lights,
and hence the board of supervisors has a choice of proceeding
either under that section or under § 1550.1, relating to road
maintenance districts.
Id.-Maintenance-Lighting.-A special road maintenance district has no duty to maintain signs, signals or street lights for
the benefit of motorists, but it has the power to maintain
street lights on a state highway for local benefit if it first
obtains a permit from the Department of Public Works.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Shasta County. Albert F. Ross, Judge. ReYersed.
Action to enjoin county and its board of supervisors from
maintaining street lighting in a county road maintenance district and to have declared illegal a contract between defendant
eounty and defendant electric company for furnishing lights
in ePrtain unincorporated communities of county. Judgment
for plaintiff reversed.
I1aurence J. Kennedy, ,Jr., and Randall J. Presleigh, District Attorneys (Shasta), Robert H. Gerdes, WilliamS. Love
and Chenoweth & Leininger for Appellants.
Robert E. Reed and \Varren P. Marsden, Counsel, Department of Public Works, State of California, and \Villiam M.
Siegel as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants.
Daniel S. Carlton, Carlton & Shadwell and Robert A.
Haughwout for Ile;;pondent.
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found in favor of plaintiff and granted
for. I<'rom this judgnwnt defendants appeal.
discloses the following facts: Three eommuthe town of Central Valley, Project City
Pine Grove is a subdivision adjacent to
Number 99, while Project City is at the junction
uf High·way Number 99 and Highway Number 209, which
highway extends to Shasta Dam. Central Y alley cons!
a town on and adjacent to Highway Number 209 and
i~ between Highway Number 99 and Shasta Dam but a short
distance from Project City.
Because of the necessity of lighting these communities along
two state highways and the county highways leading
street lights were installed by the Pacific Gas and
Ekctric Company, hereinafter referred to as the "power
eompany, '' and were maintained by voluntary contributions
foe
considerable period before the creation of the mainteJ iH!We district.
voluntary financing was unsatisfactory and it was
deemed necessary to continue the street and highway lighting
or the above-mentioned communities. 'l'herefore, defendant
board of supnrvisors established the Shasta County Hoad
J\Iai.Htenance District Number 1 under the provisions of section
1
of the Streets and Highways Code.*
-~section 1550.1 of the Streets and Highways Code reads as follows:
''
board of supervisors may form special road maintenance districts
in subdivided areas of the county wholly outside of incorporated cities.
fz,emation of said districts may be OTdered by the board of supervisors
in their opiPion ndditional road funds are necessary to properly
maintain roads in specific areas of the county. Such districts shall be
formed by order of the board setting fmth the boundaries thereof, and
in no case shall a special road maintenance district be formed where the
boundaries of said district cause it to include lands within more than
county road district as formed under Seetion 1020 of this Streets
Highways Code. Such district shall be in existence until the board
by its order discontinue such district. If such a district is to be
formed, the board of supervisors shall set a date for a hearing on said
formation. Such hearing shall not be held in less than three weeks after
date of the order for the hearing, and prior to the date of the
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After the

district was formed, the board of
on
entered into a contract with
32 lights in the
to be
the power company to
for by the county of Shasta. The property owners
the district provided the maintenance fund by special taxes.
Approximately 19 of the 32 lamps here involved are located
or upon the two state highways. The remainder are
on the streets or connecting county highways near the inter.
sections thereof with the state highways. These 19
were installed under written encroachment permit consents of
the Division of Highways.
The questions presented for determination are:
[1] First: Can a county, through its board of supervisors,
use the special road maintenance district procedure provided
in section 1550.1 of the Streets and Highways Code for
operating and maintaining a lighting system which embraces
a state highway as well as cmmty highways and streets in
unincorporated communities within the county?
'l'his question must be answered in the affirmative. The
board of supervisors of a county may form a special road
maintenance district in subdivided areas of the county wholly
outside of incorporated cities. (Sts. & Hy. Code, §§ 1550.1,
1550.2, 1550.3) The lighting of streets is included within
the word ''maintenance'' as used in section 1550.1 of the
Streets and Highways Code. Section 27 of the code reads
in part as follows : ''As used in the general provisions and
in Divisions I and II of this code, 'maintenance' includes:
. . . (e) Such illumination of streets, roads, highways and
bridges which in the judgment of the body authorized to
expend such funds is required for the safety of persons
using the said streets, roads, highways and bridges.''
[2] Plaintiff urges, however, that the word "road" used
in section 1550.1 of the Streets and Highways Code does not
include a "state highway." This contention is contrary to
the definition of the word as found in numerous authorities.
'rhe word "road" is a generic term which includes highways,
streets, public ways and thoroughfares.
hearing, a notice of said hearing shall be published twice in a newspaper of general circulation in the area, and, in addition, at least three
notices shall be posted in public places within the proposed district. .At
the hearing, protests may be heard on the proposed formation of such
district. It shall be within the power of the board of supervisors to
determine from the results of the hearing the necessity for said special
road maintenance district, and, if it be deemed necessary, the district
may be formed as hereinbefore provided.''
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Webster
New lnteruational
ed. 1937),
2155, defines the word "road" as: "A
where
may ride; an open \Yay or public passage for vehicles,
and animals; . . . Road is generally applied to a
outside of an urban district, as distinct from a
which is a highway in an urban district."
Black's Law Dictionary (4th eel. 1951), page 1491, reads:
·'Hoad. A
''
,Turis SccmHlnm ( 1944), volume
High ways,
915, reads: '' 'l'he term I highway J has been held synon~·mons with 'public road' and 'street.' "
In B. & lf. Transportation Go. v. Johnson, 122 Cal.App. 451
453 [10 P.2d flOG], the court said: "Roads and highways
generic terms embracing all kinds of public ways, such
as county and township roads, streets, etc.''
In San Franc1:sco-Oaklancl Terminal Rys. v. County of Ala66 Cal.App. 77 at 81 [225 P. 304] (hearing denied by
the Supreme Court), the court said : ''A public way over
unincorporated territory of a county is generally referred
to as a highway or road.''
In People v. Oclom, 19 Cal.App.2d 641 at G50 [8]
P.2d
, the court, quoting with approval from the Vehicle
said : '' 'Street' or 'highway' is a way or place of
whatever nature open to the use of the public as a matter
right for purposes of vehicular travel.''
To the same effect are: Johnston v. Wortham Machinery
60 Wyo. 301 [151 P.2d 89 at 91 [2]] ; Steelman v. Inhabitants of Southbridge, 34 Mass. 162 at 165; Barber Asphalt
l'aving Go. v. Headley Good Roads Go., 283 F. 236 at 237
; Herbert v. City of Richland Genter, 264 Wis. 8 [58
.W.2d 461 at 462 [1, 2]] ; Inhabitants of Windham v. CumINrland Connty Comrs., 26 Me. 406, 409; Strange v. Board
Gomrs. of Grant County, 173 Ind. 640 [91 N.E. 242 ai
; Shannon v. Martin, 164 Ga. 872 [139 S.E. 671 at 672, 54
A.L.R. 1246]; Washington County, Neb. v. Williams, 111 F.
801 at 808 [49 C.C.A. 621]; People Y. Con1rniss1:oners of ButCounty, 4 ::-.Jeb. 150 at 158.
ln Yiew of the foregoing, the conclusion is inc::;capable that
1he word "t·oa< l" as nsed in :-;ection ] G50.1 of the Streets
and Highways (!ode 8lrould be givl'll its ordinary meaning
iudude all higlmay:-;, <·owt1y or statt•. [3] It is presumed
that t lw IJ<'gislature lmew the uwani11g of the language used
the statute and used it advisedly. (Anderson v. I. M.
Jameson Corp., 7 Cal.2d 60 at 67 [59 P.2d 962].) Therefore,
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when the
used the term "roads" in section 1550.1
and used the term ''county
'' in sections 1553 and
1554, which sections are contained in chapter 7, division 2,
of the Streets and Highways Code, the presumption is that
the Legislature used these terms advisedly and intended that
each term should be given a different meaning. The presumption is not, as plaintiff contends, that when the
ture used the term "roads" it meant
roads
If the Legislature had intended to limit the application of
section 1550.1 to "county roads" it would have so stated
and not used the word ''road,'' which includes every character
of highway, including a state highway.
[4] Second: Does the maintenance of stTeet lights on state
highways lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Works?
This question must be answered in the negative. Plaintiff
apparently has abandoned this contention, which appears in
his complaint, for in his reply memo submitted to the trial
court he concedes that a highway lighting district formed
by the board of supervisors under part 4, division 14, of the
Streets and Highways Code may maintain street lights on a
state highway. On page 1, lines 24-30, he says: "We wish
to call to the Court's attention the fact that the Board of
Supervisors could unquestionably and beyond dispute have
contracted with defendant Pacific Gas & Electric Co. for
lighting State Highways 209 and 99 within the Central Valley
and Project City areas, if they so wished, by specifically
creating a highway lighting district in accordance with
the provisions of the Highway Lighting District Act."
Having conceded that a maintenance district may maintain
street lighting and that certain local taxing districts may
maintain street lighting on state highways, plaintiff is left
with the argument that the wrong local taxing district has
been employed-that this particular taxing district may maintain street lights on county highways but not on state highways. This argument is predicated npon reading something
into the statute that is not expressed and that was not
intended, that is, construing the term ''roads'' as though
it read" county highways."
[5] It does not appear that 1he Janguag·e of seetion H550.1
of the Streets and Highways Code necessarily I imits the use
of district funtls to roads that are otherwise eligible for
eounty road moneys.
The use of the word "additional" is not a limitation upon
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but rather a
meant the funds to be

C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
concurred.

J.-1 dissent.
here has, without any discussion of the comstatutory scheme set up by the Legislature in
C!+·~,.,,.., and Highways Code, decided that this case must
There
in the majority opinion, no discussion
the numerous detailed provisions set forth in the Streets
each of which has a specific bearing on
intended for each type of public way.
has, instead, relied on various dictionary definitions of the word "road," on several California cases which
not
and on numerous out-of-state cases without
any
the statutory provisions there involved. If
had no Streets and Highways Code and if it were
up to this court to decide whether or not the word "road"
be construed to include "state highway," then, and
, would the majority opinion have any
How-

l<'IscHEl~

v. CouNTY

SHASTA

California has a Streets and Highways Code which sets
forth in minute detail every conceivable factor
any
"'"''"'"u"' on any type of public way.
Inasmuch as the majority opinion leaves much to be desired
in setting forth the legislative scheme for the acquisition,
control, and maintenance of public ways, I consider it my
to present, at some length, the reason why the majority
is in error in its conclusion that the word "road" includes
''a state highway.''
The factual situation set forth in the majority opinion is
correct. The Board of Supervisors of Shasta County, acting
pursuant to section 1550.1 of the Streets and Highways Code,
formed a maintenance district to light certain parts of two
state highways. After the formation of the maintenance district, the board of supervisors entered into a contract with
the Pacific Gas and Electric Company to furnish lights on
these highways which were located in certain unincorporated
areas of Shasta County. Plaintiff objected on the ground that
the county improperly proceeded under section 1550.1 of the
Streets and Highways Code and that the contract entered
into pursuant thereto was illegal and void and should be set
aside. ·with these contentions of the plaintiff, I agree for
the following reasons :
Section 1550.1 of the Streets and Highways Code provides
that" The board of supervisors may form special road maintenance districts, in subdivided areas of the county wholly
outside of incorporated cities. Formation of said districts
may be ordered by the board of supervisors when in their
opinion additional road funds are necessary to properly maintain roads in specific areas of the county." (Emphasis added.)
The question here presented is one of first impression and
may be stated quite simply: Whether the word ''roads'' in
the above quoted section includes state highways.
Plaintiff contends that state highways are not included
within the word ''roads'' and that section 19030 of the Streets
and Highways Code provides the only method by which such
state highways may be lighted other than where the state
itself undertakes the maintenance of such lighting facilities.
Section 19030 provides that ''Any unincorporated town or
village of this State may establish a highway lighting district
for the purpose of installing and maintaining a street lighting
system on public highways, for the better protection of its
residents in accordance with the provisions of this part.'' It
is conceded by defendants that this section and those following

1
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of
within unincorporated areas, but defendants
word "roads" includes, by implication, state
and that section 27
defines "maintenance" as
the illumination of such "streets, roads, high,yays
which in the judgment
the body anthorized to
snch
for the safety
pe1·sons
highways and bridges." (Emphasi"
Plaintiff maintains that the italicized portion of
section
set forth proves his point: That section 24
,[dines ''State high·way'' as meaning any highway acquired,
id
constructed, improved or maintained as a state
pursuant to constitutional or legislative authoriza; that section 90 provides that the State Department of
Public \Vorks "shall have full possession and control of all
highways . . . ''; that section 91 provides that the
Department of Public ·works "shall improve and maintain
state highways . . . "; and that this court said in
v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 553, 559 [225
.2d 5221, that "The State Department of Public Works has
'full possession and control' of all state highways''; that, as
result, the procedure specifically outlined by sections 19000
through 19312, Division 14, Part 4, Chapters 1 through 17,
the only way in which unincorporated areas may light
state highways. These sections, relied upon by plaintiff, renire a petition, an election, and a resolution by the board
supervisors before a street lighting district may be formed
distinguished from the procedure set forth in section 1550.1
which \vas followed by defendants.
Plaintiff's argument is, in brief, that only the State Departwent of Public \Vorks as "the authorities charged with the
maintenance thereof" (concluding paragraph of section 27)
has the authority to maintain state highways unless the
Streets and Highways Code otherwise provides and that, in
ibis instance, there is an express alternative method provided
in section 19000 et seq. These sections, as heretofore
provide for a petition, an election, and a resolution by
1}Je board of supervisors before a street lighting district may
fornwd. Plaintiff correctly contends that when a statute
~cts forth a certain procedure to be followed, that procedure
exelnsive and mandatory (Gleason v. Sprau, 81 Cal. 217
P. 551, 15 Am.St.Rep. 47] ; Blalock v. Ridgway, 92 Ca1.
App. 132 [267 P. 713]; Miller v. }fcKinnon, 20 Cal.2d 83 [124
P.2d 34, 140 A.L.R. 570]; Connly of San Diego v. California
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Water etc. Co., 30 Cal.2d 817, 823, 826
A.L.R. 747]).
It is obvious that the Streets and
a comprehensive plan for the construction,
ation and control of public roads and vvays. This code
first enacted in 1935 (Stats. 1935, ch. 29). It was
to be an act to establish a streets and
consolidating and revising the law
and all the appurtenances thereto.
contain general provisions, definitions and other
code next contains Division 1 which relates to state
Division 2 relates to county highways; Division 2.5 relates'
to city streets. Each division carefully sPts forth
governing the construction, maintenance, control and possession of the different types of public ways and
to the
several public agencies jurisdiction over the different classifications.
Under "General Provisions," "Highway" is defined in
section 23; "Freeway" is defined in section 23.5; "State
Highway" is defined in section 24; "County
' is
defined in section 25. The word ''shall'' is expressly made
mandatory and the word "may" is expressly made permissive.
Section 90 provides that the ''department [of public
shall have fttU possession and control of all state highways
and all property and rights in property
for state
highway purposes. . . . '' Section 91 provides that ''The department shall improve and maintain the state highways,
including all traversable highways which have been adopted
or designated as state highways by the commission, as provided in this code." Section 27 (e) provides that "maintenance" includes "Such illumination of
highways and bridges which in the judgment
authorized to expend s1wh funds is required for the
using the said streets, roads, highways and bridges.
Almost all of Division 1 is devoted to state
l~aeh
state highway is given a route number and each route i~
specifically described in a separate section. For
section 309 provides "Route 9. Route 9 is from:
near Montalvo to Houte 4 near San Fernando.
San J<'ernando to San Bernardino.'' One entire artiele of division
1 sets forth the procedure to be followed fot'
aid for
state highways; another article deals with cooperative construction by the counties with the state, of state highways.
Still another article deals with cooperation between the
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Bven t h<' most

I'll rsor_v exami·
('oil•· ]PBds tn tlw •·on
inient WilS to provide for ever)·
<Wt·ur and that, in ilw pt·o,·ess of so
was (•xt remely explicit..

of the Streets and Highways Code deals with
" and "grade districts" and "Yacation of
str,•et;:;.'' ln this division, section 8116 is of interest
enumerates the types of public way which may be
the board of a county as county roads or
or s!nte highways, or city streets. If the word
'' included all of these, why should the I..~egislature have
time and effort in enumerating them~ Section 8145
itemizes the different types of public way as "city streets,
roads or highways, state highways." It seems very
~nq~,,~.,. that the Legislature considered a road as something
different from a county highway or a state highway
street and that it went to great lengths to he
in each division of the Streets and Highways Code.
10 deals with the Improvement Bond Act of 1915
in section 8570 we find the same specific enumeration of
different types of public ways. A further illustration
the exaetitude with which the Legislature set forth its
m~er-all plan for all public ways is found in Division 1 which
is entitled "Department of Public \Vorks." Section 145
that ''The State Engineer is authorized to lay out
construct local service roads on and along any State
'' 'l'his illustration is hut one of many which
be given to prove that when tbe Legislature meant
''road'' it said ''road'' and when it meant '' higlnvay'' it said
without equiYocation and without leaving what it meant
Under division 3, chapter 3, entitled ''HighFund" we find that the moneys payable to the
must be apportioned in eertain definite ways. :B..,or
seetion 2114 provides that "there shall be paid to
eligible thereto an amount eomputed monthly as
The number of miles of maintained eounty ~·oad
shall he multiplied by twmty-five dollars
Part 1 of division 16 is entitled "Highway Districts." Not
srction uses the word "road" or "roads." Th<•
words used are ''highways'' and ''public highways.''
2 of division 16 is entitled "Boulevard Districts." Sec26114 reads as follows: "For the purposes of this
thr dis1riet may take ovrr, control, operate, and use

or ln
any
construct any boulevard in whole or in
or upon all or any
of any
road
public high, If the lJegislaturc had intended the word "road"
to include "State higlnvay," ·why should it have entitled the
above section "Use of
road or public highway~"
Part
of division 16 is entitled "Bridge and Highway
Districts" and again, the word "road" is not used in any
of the sections in the division. Division 17 is entitled "Toll
'l'oll Ferries and 'l'oll Roads.'' Chapter 2 of this
division deals with toll highways;
3 deals specifically
with toll roads.
Division 14, part 1, is entitled ''Street I~ighting Act of
1919" and refers to the lighting of streets within a
; part
2 is the "Street Lighting Act of 1931" and also deals with
the lighting of streets within a city; part 3 is the "JJ:Innieipal
l.Jighting Maintenance District Act of 1927" and deals with
the lighting of streets within cities and municipalities. Part
4 is the "Highway Lighting Dist1·ict Aet" and refers to the
lighting of ( § 19008) "any highway, county highway, State
highway, public streets, avenue, alley, park, parkway, driveway, or public place, in any county, or unincorporated town
or village.'' Again, the Legislature has been specific and has
enumerated the various types of public ways which might
need lighting, and set forth in succeeding sections the precise
method by which it might be accomplished.
Division 14 is entitled ''The Highway Lighting District
Act'' and specifically notes that it provides for an '' alternative" method for making the improvements authorized "by
this part'' ( § 19002). This division sets forth the procedure
whereby unincorporated areas may light state highways
( §§ 19008 and 19030) when the state, as the body authorized
to make such improvements ( §§ 90 and 91) has not seen fit
to do so. Section 19008 defines "Public highway" as including any highway, county highway, or "State highway,"
thereby leaving nothing to implication. The balance of the
sections in the division contains an exact and comprehensive
plan for accomplishing what the division permits-the formation of a highway lighting district by 1tnincorporaled areas
to light state highwnys. It is elementary that when the Legislature has spoken so clearly this court should not, by implication, read "state highways" into the word "roads" in
order to approve the action taken here by the Board of
Supervisors of Shasta County in acting pursuant to section
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Code which doE's not
that as authority for the
eonelusion that the word "road" includes a
," the majority cites ·webster's New Inter' Black's Law Dietionary, Corpus ,Juris
Johnstr;n v. W oriham
from a
ease, 8tedrnan v. Inhab1:tants
a Massachusetts case, as well as a ease from
and one from Nebraska, and from \Visare not informed whether these various states

'rho majority quotes from B. &: II. 1'ransp. Co. v. Johnson.
Cal.App. 451, 453 [10 P.2d 506], that "Roads and highv·ays are generic terms embracing all kinds of publie ways,
such as county and township roads, streets, ete. '' This case
involved a construction of section 15 of article XIII of the
state Constitution which provided for taxation of public peror property transportation for compensation "over any
highway in this state between fixed termini or over a
n·gular route . . . . " The court relying upon section 2618
the Political Coc1e defined public highways as follows:
''In all counties of this state public highways are roads,
alleys, lanes, courts, places, trails, and bridges . . . ''
•·ume to the conclusion ;just set forth. It is very interesting
to note that section 2618 of the Political Code is now section
of the Streets and Highways Code which reads as follows:
"County Highway. As used in this code, 'county highway'
means any highway which is: (a) Laid out or constructerl
such by the county. (b) Laid out or constructed by other,;
nnd dedicaterl or abandoned to or acquired by the eonnty.
( ) Made a county highway in any action for the partitioll
real property. (d) Made a county highway pursuant to
" It is very obvious, therefore, that thiR ease has no
b''aring whatsoever upon a present construction of the Rtreets
and Highways Code. Also cited as authority for the proposil ion that ''road'' includes ''highway'' is San Francisco-Oak!rmd 1'cnn£nal Rys. v. County of Alameda, 66 Cal.App. 77,
[225 P. 304]. This ease involved a construction of lan';nage userl in cet·tain franchises granted to a railroad corponttion
unineorporated i erritory in Alameda County
\\·hich was annexed to and became a part of the city of
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Oakland. The language quoted in the
''A public way over unincorporated
generally referred to as a highway or road'' was taken
the following paragraph: "The case is presented on the
that the franchises covered the right to
street-car
lines 'over certain streets within unincorporated +m"";c"''"
the County of Alameda.' Strictly speaking,
word 'street'
relates to a public way within a municipality
A
way over unincorporated territory of a
referred to as a highway or road. From the
appears that in the franchises the words 'public
ways,' and 'routes' are used. A public road or
through unincorporated territory is generally a
dedicated to the public use but not owned as such
county. Generally speaking, the same applies to a public
street within a municipality. The exceptions in both instances
are where highways or streets are obtained in fee by the
county or the city through public or private grant. In most
cases the fee to the land rests in the adjoining property
owner and the public holds an easement for the use. Where
an easement only is acquired, the right lies in the people of
the state and the county or the city is merely the agent or
trustee of the state committed to the duty of maintaining
the highway for the use of the public. In the absence of any
showing to the contrary, we may assume, in support of the
judgment, that these franchises covered the
to use
public highways in which the county did not O"\Yn the
but which were dedicated to public use in the ordinary and
usual way.
''Thus, in so far as it concerns the public highways over
which the franchises were granted, the county had no property
to lose and these highways became public streets of the
of Oakland upon the annexation of the territory where they
were located, at least when so declared to be by the city
authorities. In any event, the entire jurisdiction and control
over such highways for the benefit of the state was thenceforth
imposed in the city and all jurisdiction of the county in
respect thereto ceased with the annexation.'' The court concluded that when the franchises were grant ell ''the
was merely acting as the agl'Ut of the state .. that whell
the supervision and dmtrol of these highways \Ya~; tramd'<•rred
io a new siate ageney, it carried the benefittS as well as ihe
burdens, ineluding the right to collect and retain these
charges." (Emphasis that of the court.) It is
that
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ease does not stand for the proposition that the word
" ineludes "higlrways."
v. Odorn, 19 CaL
P.2d 206], involved section 480 of the
650
In this case the defendant was charged with
a motor vehicle upon a public highway and
to stop to render aid to an
person as
subdivision
of the V chicle Code. rrhe
''There is no merit to the contention
is a fatal variance between the allegation of the
information that the accident occurred 'upon a public high, in l\Ierced County and the proof that the body of the
>ras found on 'Shaffer Road.' . . . It is immaterial
whether the accident occurred on a street in Atwater or on
extension of that street outside of the city limits, termed
Shaffer Hoad. It was called both a highway and a street.
Section 81 of the Vehidc Coclc c1dhws a highway as follows:
' "Street" or "highway" is a way or place of whatever
nature open to the use of the public as a matter of right
purposes of vehicular travel.'
''There can be no doubt the accident occurred on a roadway
open to the public for the purposes of vehicular travel. '!'here
appears to be no variance in that regard."
From this summary of the three California cases used by
the majority to prove the point that "road" includes "high, it can at once be seen ·without any stretching of the
imagination that none of them has the slightest bearing upon
construction of the Streets and Highways Code.
I would affirm the judgment.

